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Abstract
How much does luck matter to a criminal defendant in a jury trial? We use rich data on jury
selection and a novel identification strategy to causally estimate how parties who are randomly
assigned a less favorable jury (as proxied by whether their attorneys exhaust their peremptory
strikes) fare at trial. We find that criminal defendants who lose the “jury lottery” are more
likely to be convicted than their similarly-situated counterparts, with a significant eﬀect for black
defendants. Our results are robust to alternate specifications and raise important policy questions
about race and the use of peremptory strikes in the criminal justice system. In particular, our
results suggest increasing peremptory strike limits for defendants would decrease the variance in
outcomes for similarly-situated black defendants.
*Assistant Professor, Dept. of Economics, University of Florida—skostyshak@ufl.edu, 352-392-0403
**Associate Professor, Georgetown University Law Center; Aﬃliated Faculty, Georgetown McCourt School of
Public Policy—neel.sukhatme@law.georgetown.edu, 202-662-4035
The authors thank participants at the Boston University Law and Economics Workshop, the Chicago-Kent Law
Faculty Colloquium, The University of Chicago Law and Economics Workshop, the University of Florida Department
of Economics Workshop, the Georgetown Law Summer Faculty Workshop, the University of Missouri Department
of Economics Workshop and [ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS]. Special thanks to Flora Feng, Jeremy McCabe, Andrea
Muto, Ariel Polani, Takayuki Sasaki, Douglas Turner, Arturo Yanez, and Jonathan Zimmer for excellent research
assistance. All errors are the authors’ own.
1
1 Introduction
If it is a criminal case, or even a civil one, it is not the law alone or the facts that
determine the results. Always the element of luck and chance looms large. A jury of
twelve men is watching not only the evidence but the attitude of each lawyer, and the
parties involved, in all their moves. Every step is fraught with doubt, if not mystery.
–Clarence Darrow, “How to Pick A Jury,” Esquire – May 1936
For many people, an ideal of the criminal justice system is that like cases should be judged equally.
That a person’s guilt or innocence should not depend on certain personal characteristics, partic-
ularly race or gender, is central to the notion of equal protection, enshrined in the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. More recently, the creation of the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines was spurred in large part by perceived disparities across judges in sentencing terms
awarded to similarly-situated defendants.
Juries also play a central role in determining whether criminal defendants are treated equally,
as their role as decisionmakers in criminal trials is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. A primary mechanism for creating a fair and impartial jury is randomization—from
a set of eligible jurors, a random subset is chosen to serve as the “jury pool” for a particular case.
And from this pool, attorneys for both sides and the presiding judge help select who will be the
final jurors for the case.
A number of recent empirical papers have used this randomization to measure how natural
variation in the jury pool aﬀects case outcomes. Most notably, Anwar et al. [2012] find that juries
created from all-white jury pools are significantly more likely to convict black defendants than juries
formed from pools that contain even one black person, even if that person is not seated on the final
jury.1 Anwar et al. [2014] conduct a similar analysis for age, arguing that increasing the number of
older jury pool members raises conviction rates. The authors also apply an instrumental variables
approach, using the age composition of the jury pool to instrument for the age composition of the
final jury. More recent papers by Hoekstra and Street [2018] and Flanagan [2018] employ similar
identification strategies to find that broader gender and racial variation in the jury pool can aﬀect
conviction rates.
These prior identification strategies rely only on random variation in variables that are observ-
able to the econometrician when the initial jury pool is created, such as the racial, gender, and age
composition of the jury pool. They are unable to exploit variables from after creation of the pool
that might correlate with juror predisposition. Most notably, prior identification strategies ignore
information gleaned by attorneys during voir dire, the process by which attorneys question and
1As discussed in more detail below, Anwar et al. [2012] do not directly rely on an instrumental variables approach
in which the presence of the black jury pool member aﬀects case outcomes only to the extent it influences whether
the final jury will have a black member. Rather, they provide a model that suggests the presence of the black
individual in the jury pool has an indirect eﬀect on the jury that is eventually selected.
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actively interact with potential jurors in order to identify precisely what is of interest here—juror
predisposition. Attorneys rely on this information when exercising peremptory strikes, which allow
a party to exclude from the final jury a limited number of potential jurors in the jury pool.
Our paper contributes to this field by introducing a new identification strategy that uses
attorney strike behavior to capture how random variation in juror predispositions aﬀects case
outcomes. A key insight is that peremptory strikes contain information on how favorably a litigant
views the randomly assigned jury pool. To the extent litigants can accurately assess whether
potential jury members help or hurt their case, the use of strikes can tell us how favorable the
resulting jury is likely to be. As compared to prior identification strategies, our approach captures
how case outcomes depend on random variation in variables not directly observable in the data,
so long as they were observable by attorneys during jury selection.2
Of course, a litigant’s use of peremptory strikes not only reveals his view of the jury pool but
also shapes the final jury as well. To account for this confounding factor, we focus primarily on
cases at or just below the peremptory strike limit—the maximum number of strikes that state law
permits a party to exercise in a case. By focusing on the strike limit, we can distinguish those
cases in which a litigant might have wanted to strike more jurors but could not do so (because she
ran out of her n strikes) versus those cases in which the litigant chose to stop just one strike short
of the limit (i.e., she used only n  1 strikes). The identifying assumption is that these two sets of
cases are on average the same except for underlying diﬀerences in jury composition.
We apply our identification strategy to data from a large, racially diverse county in Florida, for
all non-capital felony and misdemeanor jury trials that took place from 2015 through September
2017. Our results reveal that random variation in final jury composition has a significant eﬀect on
defendants, particularly black defendants. We find that defendants who are assigned a jury pool
for which they exhaust their strikes fare significantly worse in jury trials than similarly-situated
defendants who use one less strike than the limit. This result is driven by black defendants—for
them, strike exhaustion raises the chances of conviction by 16–18 percentage points. As such, black
defendants in our sample are subject to more variation in the “jury lottery” in terms of the type
of jury they might draw. We also provide reasons why our estimates are, if anything, likely to be
a lower bound on the eﬀect of jury composition on conviction rates.
Although we cannot test our identification assumption for unobservable variables, we perform
a number of robustness checks.3 These include, for example, adding controls for other strikes used
by parties (e.g., for cause strikes, peremptory strikes by the opposing party, and a dummy for
whether the opposing party exhausted its strikes); total counts charged; defendant demographics;
2Such variables might include, for example, a prospective juror’s occupation, whether he is married, has children,
wears glasses, dresses in a suit, acts annoyed, has a strong build, or avoids eye contact during questioning.
3These robustness checks are used to test central assumptions underlying our identification strategy, as discussed
in more detail later. We also provide a model to explain structurally the suﬃcient conditions needed for the
mechanism we exploit to yield a valid estimator.
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prior imprisonment history; attorney experience and education; type of oﬀense charged; fixed
eﬀects for year of jury selection and presiding judge; and observable attributes of the jury pool.
We also test among diﬀerent subsets of our population that are especially likely to be similar,
cross-check with diﬀerent measures of defendant guilt, and compare diﬀerent measures of strike
exhaustion. The coeﬃcient of interest remains remarkably stable and significant across most
specifications.
A primary contribution of the paper is our new identification strategy for measuring the
eﬀect of the jury lottery on conviction rates. This strategy allows us to identify how variation in
juror predisposition aﬀects case outcomes without observing this predisposition directly. Previous
approaches required one to prespecify what observable juror characteristics (e.g., race, age, or
gender) might aﬀect juror behavior. But such observable characteristics might account for just
some of the variation in juror behavior. Unlike previous approaches, our novel identification
strategy allows us to capture diﬀerences within observable groups. Moreover, as compared to the
previous literature, our approach captures all information on juror predispositions, as interpreted
by attorneys, revealed during questioning.4 Our identification strategy thus uniquely positions us
to estimate the unconditional eﬀect of the jury lottery to the fullest extent possible.
In addition, our paper is the first to provide causal evidence on how peremptory strikes—and
the limits placed on those strikes—aﬀect conviction rates. This is important from a policy perspec-
tive: while all states permit some form of peremptory strikes in criminal cases, there is significant
heterogeneity among courts in terms of the procedures they follow. We hope our research will
inform ongoing policy debates as to the merits and demerits of these diﬀering approaches. In
particular, our results suggest increasing peremptory strike limits for defendants would decrease
the variance in outcomes for similarly-situated black defendants.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant prior literature. Section 3
provides more details on our identification strategy. Section 4 briefly lays out how jury selection
and peremptory strikes are used in practice and describes our data. Section 5 presents our main
results, and Section 6 provides numerous robustness checks. Section 7 briefly lays out potential
policy implications of our study and concludes.
2 Literature Review
An early analysis of jury selection and peremptory strikes was conducted by Zeisel and Diamond
[1977], who worked with a federal district court in Illinois to create “mock juries” composed of
struck and unused jurors from jury selection conducted in 12 actual criminal trials. The mock
jurors were then presented with abridged facts for the cases they would have adjudicated and were
asked to render a verdict. Among other things, the authors found that peremptory challenges
4Our proxy variable does not capture juror predispositions that are not observable to the attorney and that are
not revealed through questioning, but this variation seems unlikely to be captured by any method.
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appeared to change the verdict for at least one case. Other studies, as summarized in Devine et al.
[2001], have also used mock juries to study how jury composition aﬀects outcomes.5
More recently, a seminal paper by Anwar et al. [2012] uses natural variation in people randomly
assigned to a jury pool to measure how the racial composition of the jury pool aﬀects trial outcomes.
Using data from two rural Florida counties (Sarasota and Lake), they find that juries formed from
all-white jury pools are 16 percentage points more likely to convict black defendants relative to
white defendants. This eﬀect is eliminated if the pool happens to include at least one black
person, even if that person is not seated on the final jury.6 The paper does not formally rely on
an instrumental variables (IV) approach for its results. Rather, the authors present a model that
suggests the presence of a black candidate in the jury pool might indirectly aﬀect the final seated
jury, such as by changing who is struck from the pool.
Anwar et al. [2014] build on this work by using the same quasi-random variation in jury pools
to measure how the age of jury pool members can aﬀect conviction rates. The paper presents
both reduced form (i.e., direct eﬀect of pool variation on outcomes) and IV (i.e., eﬀect of pool
variation on outcomes through its eﬀect on final jury composition) estimates that show a strong
eﬀect, whereby defendants randomly assigned to “older” pools are much more likely to be convicted
than those randomly assigned to “younger” pools. They also find that prosecutors used peremp-
tory challenges to remove younger members in the jury pool, while defense attorneys used such
challenges to remove older members.
More recent papers have applied the same identification strategy to measure how variation
in other characteristics of jury pool members aﬀects case outcomes. Flanagan [2018] applies this
technique to North Carolina data, finding that the presence of more white jurors in a pool is
associated with higher conviction rates, and that prosecutors tend to strike potential black jurors
and defense attorneys tend to strike potential white jurors. Hoekstra and Street [2018], using data
from two other Florida counties (Palm Beach and Hillsborough), exploit the random assignment
and ordering of jurors to estimate whether the resulting jury pool is likely to be an “own-gender”
pool—one that matches the gender of the defendant. They find that increasing expected own-
gender jurors by one standard deviation (~10 percentage points) reduces conviction rates on drug
charges by 18 percentage points.
These empirical studies suggest that random pool variation can aﬀect outcomes by changing
the composition of the final seated jury in one of two ways. Either there is some sort of indirect
5Baldus et al. [2001] analyzed how peremptory strikes were used in 317 capital murder cases tried by jury in
Philadelphia in the 1980s and 1990s. Diamond et al. [2009] find that peremptory strike use was related to juror
race/ethnicity in 277 civil jury trials, but that parties’ use of strikes tended to cancel one another out. A few other
papers, such as Flanagan [2015] and Ford [2010], have created formal models of the peremptory strike process.
6See also Alesina and La Ferrara [2014], who find higher reversal rates for minority defendants who were convicted
of killing white victims in Southern states, suggesting bias at the trial level. Other recent empirical papers that
explore the impact of race within the criminal justice system include Rehavi and Starr [2014] (prosecutor charging
decisions), Abrams et al. [2012] (likelihood of incarceration), and Arnold et al. [2018] (bail decisions).
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mechanism, like the one proposed in Anwar et al. [2012], or an exclusion restriction for IV must
be satisfied, whereby the racial, gender, or age composition of the jury pool aﬀects case outcomes
only to the extent it aﬀects the racial, gender, or age composition of the final jury. Anwar et al.
[2012] follow the former approach, as the paper notes that IV requires a “strong assumption that
the only channel through which the presence of blacks in the jury pool aﬀects trial outcomes is
by increasing the likelihood of having blacks on the seated jury. If, on the other hand, any of the
indirect channels are important, the IV estimates do not have a clear interpretation . . . .”
3 Identification Strategy
In this section, we present and discuss the assumptions required for our proxy variable to be a
valid estimator of the eﬀect of the jury lottery on criminal case outcomes.7 The first link in our
identification chain recognizes that diﬀerences in average conviction rates for defendants who use all
their peremptory strikes (n strike group) and those who use one less strike than the limit (n 1 strike
group) are most closely a measure of attorney beliefs regarding the favorability of a particular jury.
The next link in the chain is from attorney beliefs to reality. It seems reasonable that attorneys
are best positioned to assess the predisposition of potential jurors. Further, attorneys have strong
incentives (greater than, for example, a judge) to develop skills to assess juror predisposition, given
their role as advocates and repeat players in courts.
Our identification strategy solves an unobserved variable problem. Ideally, we would like to
observe in some direct way whether potential jury members are more favorable to the prosecution
or the defense, as compared to the average jury member. No such data contain this information,
and it is diﬃcult to even imagine an ethical and feasible method to capture such information
directly. By measuring juror predispositions through the lens of a litigant, our proxy variable picks
up as much variation as feasibly possible given the data available.
Our basic identification strategy is driven by the subsample of cases in the n and n   1
categories. Without valid extrapolation, these results might be interesting only to the extent this
category represents a considerable subpopulation. In fact, 61.6% of our cases involved parties who
used either n or n  1 strikes (defendants used n or n  1 strikes in 54.7% of cases and prosecutors
used n or n  1 strikes in 38.4% of cases).8
The main assumption needed for identification is that there is no diﬀerence on average between
n strike trials and n   1 strike trials that aﬀects case outcomes except for diﬀerences in jury
7We also point out potential sources of bias of the estimator. Although we briefly discuss stories that would
cause a downward bias, we focus on the stories that would cause an upward bias. If the estimator were indeed
biased downwards, the conclusions we draw from the results would be even stronger than if the estimator were
unbiased.
8The prevalence of the n and n   1 groups is not unique to our data. For example, tabulating North Carolina
felony jury data from 2010–2012 as reported in Flanagan [2018], we can see prosecutors and defendants used either
n or n  1 strikes in 17.4% and 41.0% of cases, respectively.
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composition. In practice we just need this assumption to hold conditional on non-jury-composition
observables, since we test the sensitivity of our results in various conditional specifications. For
example, one way in which the assumption might be violated would be if attorney quality is
correlated with the number of strikes used; then the variation of trial outcomes between n and
n   1 cases would pick up the eﬀect of attorney quality. To address this possibility, we include
various controls for attorney quality, such as practice experience, ranking of law school attended,
use of strikes in other cases, and whether the defense attorney is a public defender.
Based on the framework discussed above, we can make an intuitive prediction: we expect a
party’s win rate to be higher for cases in which n 1 strikes are used, as compared to cases in which
n strikes are used. The magnitude of this predicted eﬀect, and whether it impacts prosecutors
and defendants diﬀerently, likely depends on the underlying distribution of jurors. By exploring
this prediction and estimating the diﬀerence between the two strike groups, we can estimate how
random variation in jury composition aﬀects case outcomes.9
4 Background on Jury Selection and Data
4.1 Background on jury selection
Applying our identification strategy to the data requires a deeper understanding of how jury
selection works in Florida, which conducts the process in a manner typical of many states. The
state maintains a list of potential jurors who may be summoned, based on individuals who have
received a drivers’ license or state identification card. Eligible jurors must be U.S. citizens, at least
18 years of age, who are not convicted of a felony and are residents of the county in which they
are to be summoned.10
If a jury trial is anticipated on a particular date, a jury administrator will summon a certain
number of potential jurors from an eligible list of jurors for that week. The administrator then picks
a random subset of the jurors who appear for jury duty to create pools for particular cases. These
groups of jurors, ordered by a randomly assigned number, are then sent to a specific courtroom,
where jury selection can begin.11
9We formalize this intuition in a model in the Appendix.
10Some jurors may request to be excused from participation for legitimate reasons, such as if they have already
been summoned and reported within the last year, they are above 70 years of age, they have a medical condition
that makes them unable to serve, they are an expectant mother, or they are not employed full-time and are a parent
of a child less than 6 years of age. See Fl. St. § 40.013. A large number of jurors also fail to show up for their
summons and do not provide an excuse. These jurors might be summoned again; some jurisdictions in the United
States even pursue criminal charges against such jurors if they repeatedly do not show up when summoned, though
such charges are rare.
11Following Anwar et al. [2012], we test whether jury pools are actually randomly assigned in our jurisdiction by
regressing certain observable pool characteristics—the proportion of female and black jurors, average juror age, and
median juror income (calculated based on the median income in the zip code in which a juror lives)—on various
defendant, attorney, and case characteristics. Our results are shown in Appendix Table A.1. Out of the 72 pair-wise
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The judge then begins voir dire—the process of asking potential jurors questions to whittle
down the jury pool into the final jury. The judge first explains some basic aspects of the case to
jurors and then asks each juror a standard series of questions that pertain to their ability to be
fair and impartial during the trial. The prosecuting and defense attorneys can then ask follow-up
questions for particular jurors. Both sets of attorneys are present for the entire questioning.
Typically the pool then leaves the room while the attorneys propose who should be struck
from the pool for cause. These are individuals who, based on their answers during jury selection,
an attorney argues will be unable to serve fairly and impartially at trial. The judge may agree to
strike these individuals and may excuse others at her own discretion as well, if she finds they are
unable to serve impartially or believes jury service would impose a considerable hardship on them.
In the sample, 30.8%, 2.7%, and 2.3% of all potential jurors in jury pools were struck for cause by
the judge, prosecution, or defense, respectively.
Next, jury selection proceeds to peremptory strikes. Unlike for cause strikes, an attorney
need not provide any reason why a juror should be struck when exercising his peremptory strikes.
The only requirement is that parties cannot strike based on the juror’s race, gender, or national
origin.12
If a juror is struck either for cause or via a peremptory challenge, the next juror in line will
take his place. Both the prosecution and the defense know who this person is before they exercise
their strike, and have the same type of information on the potential replacement as they do on the
person they might strike, since all potential jurors are questioned in front of both parties before
peremptory strikes begin.
Both sides are provided the same number of peremptory strikes, with the strike limit set by
the type of case. In Florida, parties receive 3 peremptory strikes for misdemeanors (maximum
punishment of up to one year imprisonment), 6 strikes for most felonies (maximum punishment of
at least one year but less than life imprisonment), and 10 strikes for cases involving charged felonies
in which a defendant might receive life imprisonment. In our data, 9.6% and 11.8% of all potential
jurors were struck by peremptory challenges from the prosecution or the defense, respectively.
During the peremptory strike process, the parties start with the first remaining jury candidate
and proceed one by one through the pool. First the prosecution decides whether to strike a candi-
comparisons in the table, there are seven that are significant at the 5% significance level or less. The magnitudes
of all coeﬃcients are very small. While a joint F-test suggests as a whole this specification might have one or more
coeﬃcients that diﬀer from 0, all of the estimated coeﬃcients are very small. Moreover, including these summary
jury pool measures in our regression specifications does not aﬀect our results. On the whole, these results support
an inference that the jury pools were indeed randomly constructed.
12See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (race); see also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127
(1994) (gender). If a party suspects the opposing attorney is using his peremptory strikes in an impermissibly
discriminatory manner, she may challenge a strike as it is made. The attorney who made the peremptory strike
must then proﬀer a race- and gender-neutral reason for it. The party that issued the Batson challenge can then
counter the striking party’s explanation and explain why it is pretextual. The judge immediately decides whether
to allow or disallow the peremptory strike; if she does the latter, then the attorney does not lose that peremptory
strike and can use it to strike another juror.
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date, then the defense. Once both parties have exhausted their strikes or aﬃrmatively declined to
use all of their strikes, then the final jury is set and comprises the first 6 people in the jury pool
who have not yet been struck.13 Throughout this process, the jurors are typically not present and
are not informed why any particular juror was struck or by whom she was struck.
Table 1 illustrates how voir dire might play out in a hypothetical non-life-eligible felony case.
In this example, jurors 1, 2, 7, 8, 13 and 20 were struck by the judge for cause, jurors 11 and 24 were
struck by the defense for cause, and jurors 15 and 27 were struck by the prosecution for cause. The
prosecution and defense then exercised their peremptory strikes, with the defense striking jurors
4 and 5, the prosecution striking juror 9, and so on. In the end, the defendant exhausted all 6 of
his peremptory strikes, whereas the prosecutor only used 4 of her strikes. The final 6-person jury
comprises jurors 3, 6, 10, 12, 21 and 25. In our data, 22.9% of jury pool members were neither
struck nor used, and 20.0% ended up on the final jury.
4.2 Summary statistics for n and n  1 strike groups
Our data come from a large, racially diverse county in Florida, and they comprise all non-capital
felony and misdemeanor cases in which jury selection was conducted from 2015 through September
2017. The data include detailed information on the trial participants, including the name, race,
gender, age, and address of the defendant, and the names of the presiding judge and attorneys
in the case. Using data from the Florida Department of Corrections, we can also control for a
defendant’s criminal record by measuring the number of times he has previously been imprisoned
in Florida state prison, and for how long. Using Florida state bar records, we supplement these data
with information on the attorneys’ practice experience and educational background. We also have
data on which charges were brought against each defendant under which statutory provision. Our
data further include information on the potential jurors in each case, including their demographic
information, their juror number, and whether they were struck for cause (by the judge, prosecution,
or defense), struck under a peremptory challenge (by the prosecution or the defense), not used in
voir dire, or seated on the final jury.
We have a total of 567 cases involving a single defendant14 for which a jury was selected and
neither party exceeded the peremptory strike limit.15 Out of these cases, the parties tried the case
to a jury verdict on 511 occasions (90.1% of the time). To the extent prosecutors and defendants
can identify whether a particular jury is good or bad for them, we should expect jury selection to
aﬀect both cases that are tried to a verdict and cases that settle after voir dire is conducted. As
13Most states use 12-person juries for most crimes. Florida diﬀers in that it uses 6-person juries for all crimes
except capital oﬀenses, for which it uses 12-person juries. We exclude all capital cases in our analysis.
14We exclude cases in which multiple defendants are tried jointly, since peremptory strike limits are diﬀerent in
those cases. We also exclude cases in which voir dire was conducted multiple times.
15We exclude 37 cases in which one or both parties exceeded the peremptory strike limit. As discussed below,
these are likely the rare instances in which a judge raised the limit.
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such, in our primary specifications, we look at all case outcomes (not just cases that proceed to
jury verdicts). Nonetheless, and as discussed below, we also test numerous specifications in which
we limit our sample to cases in which a jury actually rendered a verdict, and we find our results
remain largely similar.
We have a total of 213 misdemeanors, 273 non-life-eligible felonies, and 81 life-eligible felonies.
They span the full range of criminal oﬀenses commonly prosecuted in state court, including driving
under the influence, battery, burglary, robbery, theft, drug oﬀenses, sex oﬀenses, and murder. The
defendants are 55.38% black, 31.39% white, 12.52% Hispanic, and 0.35% each Asian and Indian.
Our identification strategy is similar to regression discontinuity in that we are using strike
limits as a way to distinguish jury pools with exogenous variation in how pro-prosecution or
pro-defense they are. Our treatment groups in most specifications are parties who exhaust their
peremptory strikes (n strikes); our control groups are parties who use one less strike than the
limit (n   1 strikes), though we test other control groups (e.g., parties who used < n strikes), as
discussed below.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of cases by number of peremptory strikes used by defendants
across diﬀerent oﬀense categories and for all cases in our dataset. For both non-life-eligible felonies
and misdemeanors, the two strike categories with the most cases are the n and n   1 categories,
with fewer cases in categories with fewer strikes. For life-eligible felonies, the distribution is shifted
to the left and is centered on 6 strikes (n 4). Across all oﬀense categories, the defendant exhausted
all of his strikes in 31.1% of the cases, and used one less strike than the limit in 20.9% of the cases.
These are the two most prevalent outcomes.
One can see the number of peremptory strikes used drops sharply above the limit for mis-
demeanors and non-life-eligible felonies, providing suggestive evidence that this limit is a binding
constraint on defendants in a large number of cases in those oﬀense categories.16 The few cases
(5.0%) with more strikes than the limit are the rare situations in which the presiding judge allowed
defendants to use more than their allotted share (something we confirmed is uncommon through
conversations with practicing attorneys in the jurisdiction).
Figure 2 shows an analogous distribution of cases by number of prosecution peremptory strikes.
While the overall shape of the distribution is similar, one can see the modal number of strikes for
prosecutors falls to n   1 for misdemeanors, n   3 for non-life-eligible felonies, and n   6 for life-
eligible felonies. Overall, prosecutors use fewer peremptory strikes than defense attorneys; as such,
the data suggest that peremptory strike limits are less likely to serve as binding constraints on
their choice of jurors. Across all oﬀense categories, prosecutors exhausted all of their strikes in
16By contrast, we see no such pattern for other, non-peremptory strikes. For example, Figures A.1, A.2, and
A.3 in the Appendix show the distribution of judge-issued, defense, and prosecution for cause strikes, respectively,
across the three broad oﬀense categories. The spread of such strikes is much larger than in the peremptory strike
context, with no discernible cutoﬀ (since there is no limit to how many of these strikes can be used).
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17.1% of the cases, and used one less strike than the limit in 21.4% of the cases. They exceeded
the strike limit in 1.8% of cases.
We now examine whether various baseline characteristics for the cases and attorneys vary
across strike groups. Table 2 compiles this information for both prosecution and defense strikes,
including a two-sided t-test for diﬀerence in means for the n and n   1 groups. The table also
includes data on all cases in our sample and on cases with n   2 strikes—those in which a party
used two less strikes than the limit—to provide further context.
We can see that broadly speaking, criminal defendants and the attorneys involved in these cases
appear comparable across diﬀerent strike groups. There are no statistically significant diﬀerences
in terms of defendant age, or how likely a defendant is to be black, Hispanic,17 or female across
the n and n   1 strike groups. Similarly, there are no statistically significant diﬀerences across
the n and n   1 strike groups in terms of how many prior years of imprisonment or prison stints
a defendant has previously served. Defendants in both strike classes also face similar numbers of
counts in the current case against them.
Regarding attorney characteristics, defense attorneys who use up their strikes appear to have
attended better ranked law schools18 than their counterparts who had one strike remaining, and
they face slightly less experienced prosecutors. To the extent law school ranking or attorney
experience correlates with attorney quality, we might expect this to downward bias our estimate of
the impact of defendant strike exhaustion on case outcomes. Otherwise, there are no statistically
significant diﬀerences in terms of defense or prosecutor experience, whether the defense attorney
is a public defender, or in terms of the ranking of the prosecutor’s law school. At any rate, we
control for these and other observable characteristics in our regressions below and find our results
to be largely unchanged.
In terms of the relative prevalence of common classes of cases,19 there are no statistically
significant diﬀerences between the n and n   1 strike classes at the 5% level.20 Figures 3 and 4
show this graphically, comparing the relative frequency of these cases across strike classes for both
the prosecution and defense. Once again, we see no large deviations in the relative prevalence
17Because the data reported most ethnically Hispanic defendants as white, we use a standard R-package, ethnicolr,
that relies on Florida voter registration and Wikipedia data to predict race and ethnicity based on first and last
name. See https://github.com/appeler/ethnicolr. Following Arnold et al. [2018], we chose a cutoﬀ of 0.7 predicted
probability of being Hispanic in determining whether to categorize a white defendant as such. Our results do not
depend substantially on which threshold we use to determine whether a defendant is Hispanic.
18Rankings are based on the 2018 U.S. News & World Report Rankings, commonly used to rank law school.
19These are the same oﬀense classes as used in Anwar et al. [2012] and subsequent papers.
20At the 10% significant level, it appears that defendants who exhaust their strikes are marginally more (less)
likely to be charged with violent oﬀenses other than murder (property oﬀenses), and prosecutors who exhaust their
strikes are marginally more likely to be involved in cases involving other oﬀenses.
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of certain types of cases in particular strike categories. These results are largely confirmed by
two-sided t-tests for all pairwise comparisons within oﬀense groups and across strike classes.21
5 Results
5.1 Peremptory strikes and conviction rates
We now explore how case outcomes diﬀer when a litigant exhausts all of her peremptory strikes
(i.e., n strikes used) as compared to when she has exactly one strike remaining (i.e., n  1 strikes
used). Like the previous literature, we use a linear probability model.22 Table 3 presents our main
regression results. The outcome variable in all regressions is whether a defendant was convicted
on at least one charged oﬀense.23 In columns (1)–(3), the variable “Exhausts Strikes” is a dummy
variable = 1 if the defendant used up all of his peremptory strikes; in columns (4)–(6), it is a
dummy variable = 1 if the prosecutor used up all of her peremptory strikes. Because the number
of strikes allowed diﬀers across misdemeanors and the two classes of felonies, the specifications
include controls for whether the defendant was charged with a felony and whether it was a life-
eligible oﬀense.24 Columns (2), (3), (5) and (6) also include dummy variables for whether the
defendant was black, Hispanic, or female, and controls for the defendant’s age and the number
of times he was previously imprisoned in Florida.25 Columns (3) and (6) further include controls
for the following case- and strike-specific characteristics: number of prosecution, defendant, and
judge-directed for cause strikes (each tabulated separately); number of peremptory strikes used
by the opposing side; a dummy for whether the opposing side exhausted its peremptory strikes;
number of counts charged; and a fixed eﬀect for the year in which jury selection occurred.
The coeﬃcient on Exhausts Strikes is our coeﬃcient of interest, and it is positive and significant
at the 5% level in columns (1)–(3). The coeﬃcient values indicate that strike exhaustion across
21A two-sided t-test for all 42 pairwise comparisons between the strike classes yields 41 insignificant comparisons
at the 0.05 level, with only the relative frequency of drug crimes significantly decreasing between the n   2 and
n  1 prosecution strike classes.
22Our results remain largely similar and robust if we instead use a logistic regression. Moreover, in all specifications
we use heteroskedastic robust standard errors (like the previous literature), but our results remain largely robust if
we cluster at the defendant attorney level or judge level.
23Out of the 311 cases in which a defendant was found guilty, the court “withheld adjudication” in 26 cases, which
means the defendant was found guilty but was technically not deemed convicted by the presiding judge because the
court believed he would be unlikely to recidivate. See Fl. St. § 948.01(2). Since our primary focus is on the eﬀect
of the jury rather than the judge on outcomes, we treat these cases as guilty outcomes, though our results remain
substantially the same if we instead exclude these cases from our sample.
24Our coeﬃcient of interest on Exhausts Strikes remains largely similar if we apply the same regressions separately
to misdemeanors and the two diﬀerent classes of felonies, or if we exclude life-eligible felonies from our analysis,
though some results lose significance as our decreased sample size increases our standard errors.
25Replacing or supplementing age with age2 or ln(age), or replacing number of past imprisonments with years of
past imprisonment, does not meaningfully aﬀect our results.
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all defendants increases the probability of conviction by 12 percentage points. By contrast, the
coeﬃcient on Exhausts Strikes is insignificant for prosecutors.
As noted in our identification section, if diﬀerences in jury composition are the only relevant
diﬀerences between cases in which defendants use either n or n 1 strikes (at least after controlling
for observables), then our regression results have a causal interpretation. In particular, a defendant
who receives a “bad” jury pool (i.e., one in which he is forced to exhaust his peremptory strikes)
is 12 percentage points more likely to be convicted of a crime than a similarly-situated defendant
who does not use up his strikes.
5.2 Eﬀects on black and non-black defendants
Our results suggest that strike exhaustion by a defendant is a better predictor of whether the
defendant is found guilty than strike exhaustion by the prosecutor. We now examine whether this
eﬀect on defendants is homogenous or depends on a defendant’s race.
Table 4 presents our results, using the same specifications from columns (1)–(3) in Table 3 but
instead divided by race into black and non-black defendants. We find the probability of conviction
increases by 16–18 percentage points for black defendants who exhaust their peremptory strikes (n
strikes used) as compared to black defendants who use one less strike than the limit (n  1 strikes
used). By contrast, the coeﬃcients on peremptory strike exhaustion for non-black defendants are
between 0.06 and 0.09 and are statistically insignificant.
Our results indicate that black defendants who exhaust their peremptory strikes are more
likely to be convicted than black defendants who use one less strike than the limit. Moreover,
strike exhaustion increases conviction rates more for black defendants than for non-black defen-
dants in our sample. Still, we cannot rule out that strike exhaustion has the same eﬀect on
non-black defendants as it does for black defendants when we generalize to the full population.
In particular, when we regress the conviction dummy variable on whether a defendant is black,
whether a defendant expires his peremptory strikes, and the interaction of these two variables
(along with controls for whether the underlying crime was a felony or a life-eligible crime), we
obtain a positive but insignificant coeﬃcient for the interaction. This null result might be due to
our relatively large standard errors, which in turn are likely caused by the relatively small sample
size of our study.
5.3 Within- versus between-group eﬀects of jury composition
As noted, a key feature of our novel identification strategy is that it allows us to capture the
full unconditional eﬀect of the jury lottery—that is, the impact of luck separate from measurable
diﬀerences across observable groups in the jury pool. Previous approaches could capture how
pre-specified racial, gender or age diﬀerences in the randomly-assigned jury pool aﬀect conviction
13
rates. We build on this by further capturing how variation within identifiable race-gender-age
groups (e.g., 30-year-old white females) might aﬀect conviction rates.
We can compare whether within-group variation or between-group variation in prospective
jurors has a greater eﬀect on conviction rates in our sample. To do this, we can include controls
for the composition of the randomly-selected jury pool, from which the parties exercise strikes.
We can measure, for example, the proportion of black jurors in the jury pool,26 the proportion of
females in the jury pool, the average age of members of the jury pool and the log median income
of jury pool members (with each juror’s income estimated by the median income in the zip code
in which she resides, using U.S. Census data and 2017 inflation-adjusted dollars).27
Table 5 shows the same specifications as in columns (1)–(3) of Tables 3 and 4, except with the
race, gender, age, and income jury pool controls. Most of these controls do not have a statistically
significant impact on case outcomes. The one exception is the eﬀect of log median juror income
for black defendants (a statistically significant coeﬃcient ranging from 0.85 to 0.97). Using stan-
dardized regression coeﬃcients (not shown), we can see that increasing log median juror income
by one standard deviation increases conviction rates by 14.3 to 16.3 percentage points for black
defendants.
Importantly, the coeﬃcient on defendant peremptory strike exhaustion remains positive, sta-
tistically significant, and substantially the same magnitude as in prior specifications. The enduring
importance of defendant strike exhaustion implies that within-group variation among jurors plays
a more substantial role in case outcomes than previously recognized.
5.4 Bounds discussion
The large diﬀerences we find in conviction rates between the n and n  1 groups are likely just a
lower bound on how jury composition aﬀects case outcomes. This is true for at least two reasons.
First, our results would measure the maximum possible diﬀerence between “unlucky” and “lucky”
defendants only if defendants who used all of their n strikes were all assigned the worst possible
jury pools, and defendants who used n   1 strikes were all assigned the best possible jury pools.
One or both of these events seems unlikely; as such, the diﬀerence between the most unlucky and
most lucky defendants is likely greater than what we measure here.
Second, it is unlikely that every defendant within the n strike group ran out of peremptory
strikes. Some of these defendants likely wanted to strike n, and exactly n, potential jurors and as
such, the strike limit was not a binding constraint for them. Since we cannot distinguish those
26Anwar et al. [2012], who conduct their study in largely white counties, contrast cases in which there were any
black juror pool candidates versus cases in which there were none. Because our jurisdiction is significantly more
diverse, there are very few cases in which there were no black candidates in the jury pool (only 18 out of 567 total
cases). As such, we cannot test their specifications here.
27Our results are substantially the same if we use median income instead of its log. We present log median income
as a control in the regressions here rather than levels of median income because we expect the potential income
eﬀect to be concave.
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n strike defendants from other n strike defendants for whom the strike limit was binding (i.e.,
those who wanted to strike n + 1, n + 2, or more potential jurors), our estimate of the impact
of jury composition is likely downward biased, with an actual impact even greater than what we
measure here.
6 Robustness
The identifying assumption about diﬀerences between cases involving n and n   1 strikes forms
the basis of our causal claim that variation in jury composition heavily aﬀects whether a defen-
dant—particularly a black defendant—is convicted. In this section, we present other specifications
to test various potential threats to our identification. In particular, we test whether variation in
attorney quality, crimes charged, judges, or other case-specific features might drive our results. We
also test diﬀerent outcome measures and measures of strike exhaustion, and we conduct placebo
tests.
6.1 Attorney quality
Arguably the biggest concern might be that diﬀerences in attorneys are driving the results—namely,
bad defense attorneys might be both more likely to use more peremptory strikes and more likely
to attain worse outcomes for their clients at trial. We can try to control for any such diﬀerences
through observable characteristics of the attorneys. In particular, we include controls for attorney
experience (measured in years from their date of bar passage to the date of jury selection) as well
as the ranking of the law school they attended and whether or not they are a public defender.28
Columns (1) and (5) of Table 6 present the results of including these covariates for all defen-
dants and black defendants, respectively, with the coeﬃcient of interest once again whether the
defendant exhausted his strikes in the category of cases for which either n or n   1 strikes were
used. As one can see, the regression results remain largely unchanged (or are perhaps even slightly
stronger) as compared to the coeﬃcients in the baseline specifications presented earlier.
Still, it is possible that years of practice experience and quality of law school attended do
not fully capture diﬀerences across attorneys, and that some unobservable attorney characteristics
are driving both diﬀerences in the number of strikes used and the attorney’s ability to help her
client. As a further test, we include counts for the number of cases in which each attorney used
n strikes and the number of cases in which they used n  1 strikes, to capture their propensity to
exhaust or nearly exhaust their strikes. As a second test, we limit the sample to public defenders,
who arguably share similar unobservable qualities with one another. As a third test, we limit the
28We code law schools that are unranked or whose rank is not published as ranked as 175 (the midpoint ranking
if all unranked law schools were ranked), though our results are not sensitive to this choice. Also, measuring law
school quality instead based on the natural log of law school ranking does not materially aﬀect our results.
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sample to public defenders and include the controls for number of cases in which attorneys used n
and n  1 strikes.29
The results of these tests are presented in columns (2)–(4) and (6)–(8) of Table 6 for all
defendants and black defendants, respectively. Across all columns, we can see that including the
controls for n and n 1 case counts and limiting the sample to public defenders does not weaken the
results—if anything, the coeﬃcient of interest is slightly stronger, while maintaining its statistical
significance.30
6.2 Diﬀerences in crimes charged
Another concern might be that defendants who use n strikes are charged with diﬀerent crimes that
have diﬀerent conviction rates than those who use n   1 strikes, even after controlling for broad
oﬀense groups (e.g., misdemeanors). We can control for this possibility through fixed eﬀects based
on more specific oﬀense categories under which the defendant was charged.31 Following Anwar
et al. [2012], we use the following oﬀense categories: Homicide, Other Violent Oﬀenses, Property
Oﬀenses, Drug Oﬀenses, Sex Oﬀenses, Weapons Oﬀenses, and Other Oﬀenses.32
Column (1) in Table 7 shows ordinary least squares regression results for all defendants after
adding oﬀense class fixed eﬀects to the baseline regression; column (5) shows the same regression
for black defendants. Our coeﬃcient of interest remains substantially the same and significant,
suggesting that diﬀerences in crimes charged are not driving our results.
6.3 Court/judge behavior
Yet another potential concern is that judges might treat parties who exhaust their strikes diﬀerently
from those who do not. For example, suppose a judge is annoyed with a party who uses more
peremptory strikes, because it causes voir dire to take more time, and hence the judge is more
likely to rule against that party on motions raised in the subsequent litigation. This seems unlikely
29As yet another test (not reported here), we limit our sample to cases involving attorneys who used both n
strikes and n  1 strikes at least once in our sample. Such attorneys have already shown they are willing to exhaust
or fall just short of the strike limit; as such, one might expect them to be similar to one another on unobservable
dimensions that might bear on their decision to use strikes. Limiting the sample in this manner reduces the
coeﬃcient’s magnitude and significance across all defendants, though it remains positive. However, it does not
appreciably change the magnitude or statistical significance of the coeﬃcient for black defendants. In short, black
defendants who are represented by the subset of attorneys who have used both n and n   1 strikes in the sample,
are public defenders, and have comparable practice experience and legal pedigree, are more likely to be convicted
of a crime as compared to their black defendant counterparts who use one less strike than the limit.
30We also test various specifications using prosecutor and defense attorney fixed eﬀects (not reported here). Our
coeﬃcients remain positive and similar in magnitude, but the large number of fixed eﬀects (138 diﬀerent defense
attorneys and 94 diﬀerent prosecutors across 305 cases) greatly increases standard errors, often making the results
insignificant.
31For a defendant who faces multiple charges, the classification is based on the lowest count remaining to be
decided as of the date of jury selection (i.e., it was not dropped or otherwise adjudicated before that date).
32Our results remain largely robust if we use finer-grained oﬀense categories instead.
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to be a concern at the voir dire stage, when most pre-trial motions have already been decided, and
it seems even more unlikely when comparing cases in which n 1 strikes were used versus n strike
cases, since these two sets of cases are likely very similar in terms of resources expended by the
court during jury selection.
Nonetheless, even if such an eﬀect exists, we can arguably control for it by using judge fixed
eﬀects, which allow us to pick up judge-specific factors that might aﬀect our result. Columns (2)
and (5) in Table 7 present our results for all defendants and black defendants, respectively. Once
again, we can see our coeﬃcient of interest on peremptory strike exhaustion remains substantially
the same and is statistically significant.
6.4 Multiple eﬀects
It is possible that more than one of the stories discussed in Sections 6.1 through 6.3 are true, and
are working together to drive the results. While our limited sample size does not permit us to test
all combinations that might aﬀect the results, we can include all of the controls described above in a
single regression. We present these results in columns (3) and (6) of Table 7, for all defendants and
black defendants, respectively. Again the coeﬃcient of interest maintains the same magnitude and
level of statistical significance, providing more suggestive evidence that our identification strategy
is valid.
6.5 Other measures of strike usage
We can also show that our results remain robust to diﬀerent measures of peremptory strike usage.
For example, an alternate specification might compare the class of defendants who have exhausted
their peremptory strikes (i.e., used n strikes) with any defendant who has used fewer strikes than
the limit (i.e., < n strikes). This change to our baseline specification is shown in columns (1) and
(5) of Table 8 for all defendants and black defendants, respectively. As is apparent, the change
does not materially aﬀect our results and increases the statistical significance thanks to a larger
sample.
As a further test, we can limit the sample to just those cases in which the prosecution exhausted
all of its n strikes, or where it used n 1 strikes. While this approach greatly reduces the sample size,
it also reduces the possibility of strategic interactions between prosecution and defense aﬀecting
our results. Columns (2) and (6) of Table 8 show our results when we limit the sample to cases
in which the prosecution used up all its strikes; columns (3) and (7) show the results when the
prosecution used n  1 strikes. Our results generally appear to be even stronger when we limit the
sample either way—in other words, the eﬀect of defendant strike exhaustion on conviction rates is
even more pronounced when the prosecution has used either n  1 or all n of its strikes.
Finally, we might wish to limit the sample to just black and white defendants, rather than
comparing black to non-black defendants. This also does not significantly change results, as shown
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in column (4) of Table 8, primarily because the large majority of defendants in the sample is one
of these two races.
6.6 Settlements and diﬀerent outcome measures
If parties can identify whether a particular jury is good or bad for them, that might influence case
outcomes even when the parties decide to settle a case after jury selection. As such, in our primary
specifications, we look at all case outcomes, not just cases that proceed to jury verdicts. Looking at
all case outcomes rather than just those that lead to verdicts also makes sense if we are concerned
that parties might vary in their risk preferences and hence might vary in their willingness to settle
after jury selection.33
Nonetheless, we can also compare our results to the subset of cases in which a jury issued
a verdict. These specifications, as shown in Table 9, suggest our results remain relatively robust
across diﬀerent measures of guilt, with our coeﬃcient of interest largely similar in magnitude to
that in our primary specifications. This is true both when we look at all defendants (columns
(1)–(5)) and when we limit our sample to black defendants (columns (6)–(10)).
Columns (1) and (6) report a baseline specification in which a jury issued a guilty or not
guilty verdict on at least one count, with cases coded as “guilty” if a defendant is found guilty
on at least one count. Here, the coeﬃcient on defendant strike exhaustion decreases slightly
in magnitude and loses statistical significance. However, coding guilt in this manner introduces
significant measurement error that might downward bias the coeﬃcient, since 11.9% of cases that
go to a verdict involve mixed verdicts in which a jury convicts on one count but acquits on
another. Categorizing all of these cases as defendant losses is arguably inaccurate.34 Accordingly,
the remaining columns in the table categorize these mixed verdict cases in diﬀerent ways.
Columns (2) and (7) code a case as guilty or not guilty based on the jury’s verdict on the
lowest count it adjudicated, since the lowest count generally corresponds to the most severe charge
a defendant faces. So if a jury issued a not guilty verdict on count 1 but a guilty verdict on count
2, then the case would be coded as not guilty. When coded this way, we can see our coeﬃcients of
interest increase and become statistically significant at the 10% level for all defendants and also
when we limit our sample to black defendants.35
33In our full dataset, there is a slight positive correlation between defendants who exhaust their strikes and those
who proceed to trial, though the result is not statistically significant.
34For example, one case in the dataset involves a defendant who was found not guilty by a jury of sexual battery
and aggravated battery with a deadly weapon, but found guilty of assault. He received no additional prison term
for the conviction (sentenced to time served). Characterizing this case as a defendant “loss” is arguably inaccurate.
35Still, focusing on the lowest charge is likely inaccurate for many cases as well. To illustrate, in one case in the
dataset, a defendant was found not guilty by a jury on count 1 (second degree murder with a firearm) but guilty
on count 2 (felon in possession of a firearm) and sentenced to 15 years in prison. Classifying a case like this as a
defendant “win” is arguably misleading.
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Columns (3) and (8) deal with mixed verdict cases by removing them altogether from the
sample. The coeﬃcient of interest in these specifications is similar in terms of magnitude and
statistical significance to our primary specifications.
Columns (4) and (9) categorize mixed verdict cases as guilty if they result in a jail sentence for
the defendant and not guilty otherwise. Again, we find our coeﬃcients are statistically significant
and similar to our primary specifications.
Finally, in columns (5) and (10), our outcome variable is the proportion of charges on which
a defendant was found guilty in a jury verdict.36 So if a defendant is found guilty on counts 1 and
3 and acquitted on count 2, then she would be assigned an outcome of 0.667. Again, our results
are statistically significant and similar to our primary specifications.
6.7 Asymmetric information and risk aversion
Another concern might be that asymmetric information or diﬀerences in risk preferences somehow
drive our results here. One issue might be if a defendant knows less about the potential replacement
juror than the current juror under consideration. In that scenario, a more risk-averse defendant
might be less likely to exercise a peremptory strike than a less risk-averse defendant. And if a
defendant’s risk aversion during jury selection is inversely related to the strength of the prosecutor’s
case—which might occur if a defendant who has a strong case feels less obliged to take risks during
jury selection—then we might expect defendants who exhaust their peremptory strikes to have
worse quality cases (and hence worse outcomes) than those who do not exhaust them.
Although such a concern might be relevant in other settings, it likely does not aﬀect our results
here. This is because in Florida, parties have the same information on all potential jurors in the
pool, since all pool members are questioned at the outset by the judge and both parties.37
A variant of this concern might be that a defendant only knows the average predisposition for
each juror in the pool rather than the full distribution of potential outcomes for each juror. To
illustrate, suppose there are two otherwise identical black defendants (defendant 1 and defendant
2), both charged with the same crime and facing the same potential prison sentence. Defendant
1 knows he is innocent and the evidence is on his side, so he expects there is a small chance of
being found guilty. As such, he does not need to take chances during jury selection and can play
it relatively safe. By contrast, defendant 2 knows she is guilty and the evidence is against her, so
she expects a higher chance of being found guilty. This defendant’s only chance of receiving a "not
guilty" verdict or a hung jury is to take a chance on the jurors.
36Flanagan [2018] uses a similar specification as a robustness check.
37There are apparently relatively few cases in which a court runs out of jury pool members, since jury admin-
istrators take into account the type of case scheduled for trial and a judge’s preferences when deciding how many
people to summon and how large the initial pool for a case should be. On the rare occasions when this occurs,
information about potential jurors would be revealed in two separate stages of voir dire.
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Suppose the current juror under consideration for either defendant is a white male, and the
replacement juror is a white female. Suppose also that all white males are identical in terms of
their predisposition toward black defendants, but there are two types of white females—those who
are are very likely to convict a black defendant and those who are very unlikely to convict a black
defendant—and that attorneys cannot distinguish between these two types. Even if, on average,
a white female is more likely to convict the defendant than a white male, defendant 2 might take
a chance on the white female since that is his only chance to win the case. As such, defendant 1
and defendant 2 might diverge in terms of their striking behavior.
While such a concern might also be relevant, it is unlikely to aﬀect our results because there
is no reason to believe a higher variance juror (i.e., the white female in the example above) will be
more likely to appear in a replacement slot versus the current juror slot. This is because potential
jurors are randomly ordered in the pool. So on average, risk aversion should not bias our results,
even though it might aﬀect how a particular defendant uses his strikes. Defendant 2 will end up
with a riskier juror, but there is no reason to believe he is more likely to end up in the n strike
class versus the n  1 strike class.38
6.8 Placebo tests
Finally, we can conduct placebo tests to test whether there is anything special about cases in which
parties exhaust peremptory strikes. In particular, instead of comparing the diﬀerence between n
and n   1 strike cases, we can imagine the strike boundary to be at n   1 instead, and hence
compare n  1 and n  2 strike cases. If strike exhaustion really matters, as we posit it does, then
we should see a much diminished eﬀect39 or no eﬀect at all at the placebo boundary.
Table 10 shows the same specifications as in columns (1)–(3) of Tables 3 and 4, except now
defendant strike exhaustion is defined at the placebo boundary. The coeﬃcient on placebo strike
exhaustion is insignificant and close to zero in all specifications, whether we look across all cases
or just cases with black defendants. These results provide additional support that diﬀerences in
jury composition, and not just another variable correlated with an increased use of peremptory
strikes, is what drives our primary results.
38Another potential concern might be that the variance of juror predispositions increases as the quality of a
defendant’s case worsens. Put diﬀerently, jurors on the whole might become riskier when defendants have a poor
quality case. If so, we might expect defendants to use more strikes when they have worse cases, since they are facing
a more extreme jury pool. If this theory were true, we should expect to see a steady increase in conviction rates as
defendants use additional strikes, rather than a large jump at the strike exhaustion boundary. But as discussed in
the next section, this is not what we see when we conduct placebo tests.
39One might still expect a jury pool to be more favorable to the striking party in an n  2 strike case than in an
n  1 strike case because exercising the penultimate strike is still costly, as it removes the possibility of striking two
prospective jurors later on in voir dire. Nonetheless, the cost of the penultimate strike should be less than the cost
of the last strike if the only diﬀerence on average between diﬀerent strike groups is diﬀerences in jury composition.
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7 Policy Implications and Conclusion
In this paper, we provide new empirical evidence on how random variation in jury composition
aﬀects criminal case outcomes. Our approach diﬀers from previous related empirical work, which
focused only on the eﬀect of random variation in a few variables observable at the time the initial
jury pool was created.
Our central insight is that peremptory strikes are not just potential confounders; they also
signal how litigants view the jury pool they have been randomly assigned. All else being equal, we
expect a litigant who can accurately assess whether a juror favors her side would use more strikes
when she has been assigned an unfavorable pool than when she has been assigned a favorable one.
Thus, litigants’ use of strikes enables us to identify juror predisposition, which would otherwise be
unmeasurable. The identifying assumption in the most conservative specification is that cases in
which litigants use all of their peremptory strikes (n strike group) are on average identical to cases
in which litigants use one less strike than the limit (n   1 strike group), except for diﬀerences in
the jury pool they have been assigned.
Using recent data from a large, racially diverse county in Florida, we find our n and n 1 strike
groups appear largely similar on a broad range of observable characteristics, including defendant
demographics and past imprisonment history, attorney experience and education, and charged
oﬀenses. We find defendants who use all n of their peremptory strikes are significantly more likely
to be convicted than defendants who use one less strike than the limit. This result is driven
by black defendants, for whom strike exhaustion increases conviction rates by 16–18 percentage
points. We explain why these results are likely a lower bound on the eﬀect of jury composition
on case outcomes. We also run multiple robustness checks with a battery of covariates and across
various subsamples; we find our coeﬃcient of interest remains remarkably stable and significant
across nearly every specification.
The primary contribution in this paper is a new framework for identification, which we use to
measure the large impact of variation in jury composition, particularly for black defendants. In
addition, we believe our paper makes a number of other contributions.
First, apart from issues of jury composition, our results are the first empirical evidence of
the causal impact of peremptory strikes on case outcomes. Scholars have questioned for decades
whether peremptory strikes aﬀect how a case turns out, or whether attorneys can correctly identify
during the strike process which jurors are likely to be predisposed toward their side.40 Our research
suggests that peremptory strikes (and the limits placed on those strikes) do in fact aﬀect case
outcomes, and that attorneys are at least somewhat eﬀective in using those strikes to shape the
40See, e.g., Ford [2010], Zeisel and Diamond [1977].
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final jury.41 Our results also suggest increasing peremptory strike limits for defendants would be
one way to decrease the variance in outcomes for similarly-situated black defendants.42
To be sure, our paper cannot settle larger debates among scholars whether peremptory chal-
lenges are socially beneficial or harmful,43 or whether they make it more likely that guilty people
are convicted and innocent people are acquitted in jury trials. Answering the latter question in
particular would require, among other things, knowing whether defendants actually committed the
underlying crimes for which they are charged, which we cannot determine. Regardless, the wide
variation in outcomes we measure, driven by pure chance and concentrated among black defen-
dants, raises concerns. This problem is magnified given that a large percentage of defendants in
our data exhausted their strikes and thus might be aﬀected by the phenomenon we identify here.
Relatedly, the approach we describe here might be a useful diagnostic tool to determine
whether jury selection rules in a particular jurisdiction are potentially problematic. Put diﬀer-
ently, if parties are awarded a suﬃcient number of peremptory strikes, either the proportion of
cases with n and n   1 strikes should be small; or we should not find any statistically significant
diﬀerence in conviction rates between the groups. The presence of large diﬀerences across these
groups might be evidence that random variation in jury composition is having an outsize eﬀect on
criminal case outcomes in that jurisdiction.
Finally, our paper raises deeper policy questions about how jury selection should be conducted
so that the final jury is as close as possible to being impartial. Several factors that aﬀect jury
composition need to be further isolated and examined. For example, should attorneys know who
the next potential juror is when they decide whether to use a strike (as is the case in Florida but
not in some other states)? Should attorneys be allowed to view the jury pool when making strike
decisions, so as to see the age, race, and sex of potential jurors, even though the latter two are
protected classes on which attorneys are not permitted to discriminate? How should the number
of strikes be chosen and how should it relate to the final jury size? Our paper motivates why
answers to these questions could be important for designing a fair voir dire process. As such, we
hope our work sets the stage for further theoretical and empirical research on jury selection.
41Even though the vast majority of criminal cases result in plea bargains that occur before jury selection, a long
literature discusses how this bargaining process might occur in the shadow of the expected results of the jury trial.
Compare Mnookin and Kornhauser [1978], Easterbrook [1983], Oﬃt [2019] with Bibas [2004]. If this is true, the
phenomenon we identify here might have a significant impact on pretrial negotiations, at least in cases the parties
were considering taking to trial. For example, if black defendants are risk-averse and they face more risk in the
jury lottery than non-black defendants, they might be more likely to settle cases before trial and on worse terms
(because of weaker bargaining power) than they would in the absence of this heightened risk.
42The federal court system and a number of state courts already give defendants more peremptory strikes than
prosecutors. See, e.g., Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(b)(2) (defense and prosecution get 10 and 6 strikes, respectively, in
non-capital felonies); Maryland Rule 4-313(a)(2) (defense and prosecution get 20 and 10 strikes, respectively, for
life-eligible crimes); Minn. Crim. P. R. 26.02(9) (defense and prosecution get 15 and 9 strikes, respectively, for
life-eligible crimes); New Mexico Crim. P. R. 5-606(D)(b) (defense and prosecution get 12 and 8 strikes, respectively,
for non-capital, life-eligible crimes).
43See, e.g., Flanagan [2015], Babcock [1974], Howard [2010].
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Figures
Figure 1: Peremptory Strikes: Defense
Notes : This figure shows histograms for the number of peremptory strikes used by the defense
in the 604 trials from 2015 through September 2017 in our full dataset (includes cases in which
parties exceeded their peremptory strike limits). The peremptory strike limits for the three
oﬀense classes of misdemeanor, non-life-eligible felony, and life-eligible felony are 3, 6, and 10,
respectively, as shown by the vertical lines.
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Figure 2: Peremptory Strikes: Prosecution
Notes : This figure shows histograms for the number of peremptory strikes used by the prose-
cution in the 604 trials from 2015 through September 2017 in our full dataset (includes cases
in which parties exceeded their peremptory strike limits). The peremptory strike limits for the
three oﬀense classes of misdemeanor, non-life-eligible felony, and life-eligible felony are 3, 6,
and 10, respectively, as shown by the vertical lines.
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Figure 3: Proportion of Crimes Across Peremptory Strike Classes: Defense
Notes : This figure shows the percentage of cases in each of seven diﬀerent oﬀense categories (as
used in Anwar et al. 2012), across three diﬀerent peremptory strike groups for defendants. The
n, n   1 and n   2 strike groups comprise defendants who exhausted all of their peremptory
strikes, one less strike than the limit, and two less strikes than the limit, respectively.
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Figure 4: Proportion of Crimes Across Peremptory Strike Classes: Prosecution
Notes : This figure shows the percentage of cases in each of six diﬀerent oﬀense categories (as
used in Anwar et al. 2012), across three diﬀerent peremptory strike groups for the prosecution.
The n, n 1 and n 2 strike groups comprise prosecutors who exhausted all of their peremptory
strikes, one less strike than the limit, and two less strikes than the limit, respectively.
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Tables
Table 1: Hypothetical Jury Selection Strike Sheet
Seat #
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Row #
1 JC JC J-1 D-1 D-2 J-2 JC JC P-1 J-3
2 DC J-4 JC D-3 PC D-4 P-2 D-5 P-3 JC
3 J-5 D-6 P-4 DC J-6 NU PC NU JC NU
Notes : This table shows a hypothetical jury selection strike sheet for
a non-life-eligible felony case. The pool comprises 30 jurors, ordered
from row 1, seat 1, to row 3, seat 10. JC marks jury pool mem-
bers who were struck for cause by the judge; DC and PC mark pool
members successfully struck for cause by the defense and prosecution,
respectively. D-# and P-# mark pool members for whom the defense
and prosecution, respectively, issued peremptory strikes, with the #
of the strike used. J-# marks pool members selected for the final
jury. NU marks jury pool members who were neither struck nor used
in the final jury.
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Table 2: Baseline Characteristics in n, n  1, and n  2 Strike Groups by Party
Defense Prosecution
All n strikes n  1 strikes n  2 strikes n v. n  1 n strikes n  1 strikes n  2 strikes n v. n  1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Defendant characteristics
Age 36.84 37.52 35.39 38.32 2.13 36.43 38.12 37.53 -1.69
(12.68) (13.27) (11.76) (12.52) (1.44) (11.69) (13.77) (12.58) (-0.94)
Black 0.55 0.52 0.52 0.49 -0.00 0.55 0.47 0.53 0.08
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (-0.02) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (1.11)
Hispanic 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.00 0.17 0.13 0.12 0.04
(0.34) (0.35) (0.34) (0.34) (0.11) (0.38) (0.34) (0.33) (0.79)
Female 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.17 -0.00 0.13 0.10 0.17 0.03
(0.34) (0.35) (0.35) (0.38) (-0.09) (0.33) (0.30) (0.38) (0.67)
# Prev. Imprisonments 0.55 0.43 0.52 0.74 -0.09 0.55 0.46 0.51 0.08
(1.32) (1.05) (1.31) (1.97) (-0.69) (1.30) (1.37) (1.33) (0.46)
Years Prev. Imprison. 1.26 1.33 0.73 1.20 0.60 1.37 1.20 1.00 0.18
(3.51) (4.12) (1.90) (3.46) (1.52) (3.88) (3.78) (2.47) (0.34)
Attorney characteristics
Defense Experience 9.71 7.82 9.66 10.31 -1.84 7.65 8.17 8.82 -0.52
(10.32) (10.02) (11.01) (10.50) (-1.51) (10.18) (10.73) (10.26) (-0.36)
Prosecutor Experience 5.51 3.63 5.18 5.88 -1.55** 3.71 4.27 4.97 -0.56
(5.66) (4.33) (6.38) (4.82) (-2.51) (4.32) (4.72) (6.18) (-0.89)
Def. Law Sch. Rank 87.86 80.99 95.02 93.27 -14.03** 92.28 80.83 89.83 11.46
(54.84) (53.70) (57.15) (56.66) (-2.17) (53.80) (53.43) (54.66) (1.54)
Pr. Law Sch. Rank 100.33 96.90 96.48 97.62 0.42 95.55 101.37 94.76 -5.82
(56.05) (54.87) (55.87) (57.03) (0.06) (57.66) (55.69) (56.26) (-0.74)
PD 0.75 0.77 0.72 0.73 0.05 0.81 0.77 0.76 0.04
(0.44) (0.42) (0.45) (0.45) (0.95) (0.39) (0.42) (0.43) (0.68)
Case characteristics
Homicide 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.05 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.01
(0.18) (0.10) (0.13) (0.22) (-0.40) (0.10) (0.13) (0.13) (-0.36)
Other Violent Oﬀense 0.40 0.49 0.38 0.40 0.10* 0.47 0.56 0.46 -0.09
(0.49) (0.50) (0.49) (0.49) (1.78) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (-1.28)
Property Oﬀense 0.18 0.12 0.19 0.17 -0.07* 0.11 0.13 0.17 -0.02
(0.38) (0.32) (0.40) (0.38) (-1.78) (0.31) (0.34) (0.37) (-0.56)
Drug Oﬀense 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.07 -0.02 0.06 0.05 0.12 0.01
(0.28) (0.27) (0.31) (0.26) (-0.69) (0.24) (0.22) (0.33) (0.46)
Sex Oﬀense 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.07 -0.00 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.02
(0.26) (0.20) (0.21) (0.26) (-0.20) (0.22) (0.18) (0.09) (0.74)
Weapons Oﬀense 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 -0.00 0.03 0.05 0.03 -0.02
(0.21) (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) (-0.10) (0.18) (0.22) (0.16) (-0.63)
Other Oﬀense 0.18 0.22 0.22 0.20 0.01 0.26 0.16 0.20 0.10*
(0.39) (0.42) (0.41) (0.40) (0.12) (0.44) (0.37) (0.40) (1.82)
Counts Charged 2.44 2.10 2.43 3.00 -0.33 2.27 2.04 2.51 0.23
(2.37) (1.87) (2.69) (3.60) (-1.29) (2.68) (1.46) (2.47) (0.82)
Pool characteristics
Prop. Black in Pool 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 -0.00 0.12 0.13 0.13 -0.01
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (-0.19) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (-1.28)
Prop. Female in Pool 0.54 0.53 0.53 0.54 0.00 0.53 0.53 0.55 0.00
(0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.02) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.23)
Avg. Age in Pool 46.91 47.12 46.70 46.53 0.42 47.05 46.79 46.82 0.26
(3.19) (3.31) (3.60) (2.69) (1.05) (3.24) (3.19) (3.64) (0.60)
Median Income in Pool 62,689 62,838 62,383 62,644 454 63,274 62,574 62,384 700
(3,263) (3,628) (3,006) (3,373) (1.16) (3,181) (3,870) (3,350) (1.43)
Observations 567 185 125 81 – 95 123 115 –
Notes : This table compares baseline characteristics for diﬀerent peremptory strike groups. Column (1) shows summary statistics for all cases
in our primary dataset. The n, n  1, and n  2 strike groups comprise parties who exhausted all of their peremptory strikes, one less strike
than the limit, and two less strikes than the limit, respectively, for defendants (columns (2)–(4)) and prosecutors (columns (6)–(8)). Defense
attorney experience is number of years between attorney admittance to the Florida state bar and date of jury selection. Law school rankings
are calculated based on 2018 U.S. News & World Report rankings. Black, Hispanic, Female and PD (public defender) are dummy variables
for these respective characteristics. Number of previous imprisonments is a count variable of the number of previous stints a defendant had
in Florida state prison; years of previous imprisonment measures the total time in prison for those stints. Counts charged are the number of
counts that a defendant is charged with at the time of jury selection. Proportion black and proportion female are the proportion of black and
female jurors, respectively, in the pre-strike jury pool. Average age is the average age of pool members. Median pool income is calculated by
estimating each juror’s income by the median income in the zip code in which she resides (using U.S. Census data and 2017 inflation-adjusted
dollars). Values in parentheses are standard deviations for columns (1)–(4) and (6)–(8), and t-values for two-sided t-tests in columns (5) and
(9). ** = significant at 5% level, * = significant at 10% level.
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Table 3: Eﬀect of Strike Exhaustion on Conviction
Defense Prosecution
Guilty Guilty Guilty Guilty Guilty Guilty
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exhausts Strikes 0.12** 0.12** 0.12** 0.04 0.04 -0.00
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Felony 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.30*** 0.43*** 0.39*** 0.54***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.10) (0.06) (0.06) (0.15)
Life Eligible Crime -0.16 -0.18 -0.24 -0.16 -0.20 -0.01
(0.13) (0.13) (0.16) (0.17) (0.18) (0.21)
Age – -0.00 -0.00 – -0.01** -0.01***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Black – -0.09 -0.09 – -0.10 -0.10
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Hispanic – 0.12 0.07 – 0.02 -0.06
(0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10)
Female – 0.04 0.03 – -0.14 -0.15
(0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.12)
# Prev. Imprisonments – 0.04* 0.03 – 0.05*** 0.06***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 0.38*** 0.40*** 0.30** 0.43*** 0.72*** 0.70***
(0.05) (0.12) (0.13) (0.05) (0.12) (0.16)
Observations 310 305 305 218 213 213
Adj. R-squared 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.21
Other Case Controls NO NO YES NO NO YES
Notes : This table presents OLS regressions of peremptory strike exhaustion on guilt.
The dependent variable in all specifications is a dummy variable = 1 if a defendant
is convicted on at least one charged oﬀense on or after the date of jury selection, and
= 0 otherwise. The primary coeﬃcient of interest is Exhausts Strikes, which = 1 if
the party used up its n strikes and = 0 if it used one less strike than the limit (n   1
strikes). Columns (1)–(3) measure defense exhaustion of peremptory strikes; columns
(4)–(6) measure prosecution exhaustion of those strikes. Columns (3) and (6) include
separate case controls for number of for cause strikes issued by the judge, prosecution,
and defense; total number of counts charged; a dummy for whether the opposing party
exhausted its peremptory strikes; and a fixed eﬀect for the year in which jury selection
occurred. Heteroskedastic robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** =
significant at 1% level, ** = significant at 5% level, * = significant at 10% level.
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Table 4: Eﬀect of Strike Exhaustion on Conviction for Black and Non-Black Defendants
Black Defendants Non-Black Defendants
Guilty Guilty Guilty Guilty Guilty Guilty
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exhausts Strikes 0.16** 0.18** 0.17** 0.09 0.06 0.08
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Felony 0.47*** 0.45*** 0.40*** 0.33*** 0.32*** 0.17
(0.07) (0.07) (0.12) (0.07) (0.08) (0.15)
Life Eligible Crime -0.20 -0.22 -0.17 -0.08 -0.12 -0.30
(0.16) (0.17) (0.20) (0.19) (0.21) (0.27)
Age – -0.00 -0.00 – 0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Female – 0.03 0.03 – 0.06 0.07
(0.13) (0.14) (0.11) (0.12)
# Prev. Imprisonments – 0.06 0.07* – 0.03 0.03
(0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
Hispanic – – – – 0.13 0.08
(0.09) (0.09)
Constant 0.26*** 0.30** 0.08 0.48*** 0.40*** 0.37**
(0.07) (0.14) (0.16) (0.07) (0.15) (0.18)
Observations 161 159 159 149 146 146
Adj. R-squared 0.19 0.18 0.24 0.10 0.10 0.07
Other Case Controls NO NO YES NO NO YES
Notes : This table presents OLS regressions of defendant peremptory strike exhaustion
on guilt, broken down by race. The dependent variable in all specifications is a dummy
variable = 1 if a defendant is convicted on at least one charged oﬀense on or after the
date of jury selection, and = 0 otherwise. The primary coeﬃcient of interest is Exhausts
Strikes, which = 1 if the defendant used up his n strikes and = 0 if he used one less
strike than the limit (n 1 strikes). Columns (1)–(3) measure exhaustion of peremptory
strikes by black defendants; columns (4)–(6) measure exhaustion of strikes by non-black
defendants. Columns (3) and (6) include separate case controls for number of for cause
strikes issued by the judge, prosecution, and defense; total number of counts charged;
a dummy for whether the prosecution exhausted its peremptory strikes; and a fixed
eﬀect for the year in which jury selection occurred. Heteroskedastic robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses. *** = significant at 1% level, ** = significant at
5% level, * = significant at 10% level.
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Table 5: Eﬀect of Strike Exhaustion With Jury Composition Controls
All Defendants Black Defendants
Guilty Guilty Guilty Guilty Guilty Guilty
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exhausts Strikes 0.12** 0.11** 0.12** 0.17** 0.19** 0.18***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Felony 0.39*** 0.38*** 0.29*** 0.47*** 0.44*** 0.38***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.10) (0.07) (0.07) (0.12)
Life Eligible Crime -0.17 -0.18 -0.26 -0.17 -0.20 -0.20
(0.12) (0.13) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.20)
Age – -0.00 -0.00 – -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Female – 0.04 0.04 – -0.01 -0.01
(0.09) (0.09) (0.14) (0.15)
# Prev. Imprisonments – 0.04* 0.03 – 0.06 0.08**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
Black – -0.09 -0.09 – – –
(0.06) (0.06)
Hispanic – 0.12 0.07 – – –
(0.08) (0.09)
Prop. Black in Pool -0.09 0.03 0.14 0.27 0.45 0.64
(0.45) (0.44) (0.45) (0.60) (0.60) (0.62)
Avg. Age in Pool -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Prop. Female in Pool 0.06 0.12 0.20 0.43 0.48 0.57
(0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.38) (0.39) (0.39)
Ln Median Income in Pool 0.38 0.39 0.36 0.86** 0.97** 0.85**
(0.31) (0.30) (0.30) (0.38) (0.39) (0.38)
Constant -3.84 -4.10 -3.86 -8.96** -10.31** -9.41**
(3.44) (3.35) (3.35) (4.29) (4.40) (4.32)
Observations 310 305 305 161 159 159
Adj. R-squared 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.20 0.20 0.26
Other Case Controls NO NO YES NO NO YES
Notes : This table presents OLS regressions of defendant peremptory strike exhaustion on
guilt. The dependent variable in all specifications is a dummy variable = 1 if a defendant
is convicted on at least one charged oﬀense on or after the date of jury selection, and = 0
otherwise. The primary coeﬃcient of interest is Exhausts Strikes, which = 1 if the defendant
used up his n strikes and = 0 if he used one less strike than the limit (n 1 strikes). Columns
(1)–(3) include all defendants; columns (4)–(6) are limited to black defendants. Columns
(3) and (6) include separate case controls for number of for cause strikes issued by the
judge, prosecution, and defense; total number of counts charged; a dummy for whether the
prosecution exhausted its peremptory strikes; and a fixed eﬀect for the year in which jury
selection occurred. Heteroskedastic robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***
= significant at 1% level, ** = significant at 5% level, * = significant at 10% level.
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Table 7: Eﬀect of Strike Exhaustion on Conviction: Charge/Judge Fixed Eﬀects
All Defendants Black Defendants
Guilty Guilty Guilty Guilty Guilty Guilty
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Def. Exhausts Strikes 0.11** 0.12** 0.16*** 0.16** 0.20** 0.18**
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09)
Felony 0.20* 0.25 0.05 0.27* 0.49 0.16
(0.10) (0.38) (0.36) (0.15) (0.32) (0.36)
Life Eligible Crime -0.23 -0.22 -0.10 -0.12 -0.11 0.02
(0.18) (0.18) (0.20) (0.21) (0.20) (0.24)
Age 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Female 0.04 0.04 -0.03 0.06 0.04 -0.05
(0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.14) (0.15) (0.20)
# Prev. Imprisonments 0.03 0.04* 0.04 0.06 0.07* 0.08
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Black -0.11* -0.06 -0.08 – – –
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Hispanic 0.08 0.08 0.13 – – –
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
Constant 0.48* 0.28 0.16 0.17 0.13 -0.08
(0.26) (0.20) (0.37) (0.32) (0.27) (0.45)
Observations 305 305 279 159 159 147
Adj. R-squared 0.18 0.16 0.23 0.25 0.23 0.30
Other Case Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Charge Fixed Eﬀect YES NO YES YES NO YES
Judge Fixed Eﬀect NO YES YES NO YES YES
Attorney Controls NO NO YES NO NO YES
Notes : This table presents OLS regressions of defendant exhaustion of peremp-
tory strikes on guilt, with the inclusion of various fixed eﬀects. Columns (1)–(3)
include all defendants; columns (4)–(6) are limited to black defendants. Columns
(1), (3), (4), and (6) include controls for oﬀense category (as defined in Anwar
et al. 2012) of the first charged oﬀense remaining as of the date of jury selec-
tion. Columns (2), (3), (5) and (6) include fixed eﬀects for the judge assigned
to the case. Columns (3) and (6) also include controls for both prosecutor and
defense attorney years of experience and ranking of law school attended, as well
as a dummy variable if the defense attorney was a public defender. All columns
include separate case controls for number of for cause strikes issued by the judge,
prosecution, and defense; total number of counts charged; a dummy for whether
the prosecution exhausted its peremptory strikes; and a fixed eﬀect for the year
in which jury selection occurred. All other variables are as described in earlier
tables. Heteroskedastic robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** =
significant at 1% level, ** = significant at 5% level, * = significant at 10% level.
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Table 8: Eﬀect of Strike Exhaustion on Conviction: Diﬀerent Strike Definitions
All Defendants Black Defendants
Guilty Guilty Guilty Guilty Guilty Guilty Guilty
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Def. Exhausts Strikes 0.13*** 0.38*** 0.24** 0.13** 0.15** 0.29** 0.19
(0.04) (0.10) (0.10) (0.06) (0.06) (0.13) (0.18)
Felony 0.27*** 0.40*** 0.01 0.27*** 0.39*** 0.32* 0.18
(0.06) (0.15) (0.13) (0.10) (0.08) (0.18) (0.23)
Life Eligible Crime -0.01 -0.16 -1.62*** -0.27 0.03 – –
(0.06) (0.15) (0.24) (0.18) (0.09)
Age -0.00 -0.00 -0.01** 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Female 0.03 0.06 -0.34** 0.01 0.05 0.02 -0.14
(0.06) (0.17) (0.15) (0.10) (0.09) (0.22) (0.29)
# Prev. Imprisonments 0.02 0.06 0.08*** 0.04* 0.01 0.01 0.19***
(0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.06)
Black -0.07 0.02 -0.20* -0.07 – – –
(0.05) (0.11) (0.11) (0.06)
Hispanic 0.04 -0.05 0.13 – – – –
(0.06) (0.15) (0.17)
Constant 0.34*** 0.05 0.57** 0.14 0.10 0.10 0.44
(0.10) (0.21) (0.24) (0.14) (0.11) (0.26) (0.41)
Observations 559 82 94 264 306 48 42
Adj. R-squared 0.15 0.26 0.23 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.19
Other Case Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Def. n v. < n strikes YES NO NO NO YES NO NO
Only Black & White Defs. NO NO NO YES NO NO NO
# Prosecution Strikes – n n  1 – – n n  1
Notes : This table presents alternate specifications for OLS regressions of defendant peremptory
strike exhaustion on guilt. Def. Exhausts Strikes = 1 if the defendant used up his n strikes. In
columns (1) and (5), this variable = 0 if the defendant used fewer strikes than the limit (n strikes);
in all other columns it = 0 if the defendant used just one less strike than the limit (n   1 strikes).
The dependent variable in all specifications is a dummy variable = 1 if a defendant is found guilty
on at least one charged oﬀense, and = 0 otherwise. Columns (2), (6), and (3), (7) limit the sample
to cases in which the prosecution used n or n  1 of its strikes, respectively. Column (4) limits the
sample by race to just black and white defendants. All columns include separate case controls for
number of for cause strikes issued by the judge, prosecution, and defense; total number of counts
charged; a dummy for whether the prosecution exhausted its peremptory strikes; and a fixed eﬀect
for the year in which jury selection occurred. All other variables are as described in earlier tables.
Heteroskedastic robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** = significant at 1% level,
** = significant at 5% level, * = significant at 10% level.
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Table 10: Eﬀect of Placebo Strike Exhaustion
All Defendants Black Defendants
Guilty Guilty Guilty Guilty Guilty Guilty
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Placebo Exhausts Strikes -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 0.01 0.02
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09)
Felony 0.35*** 0.37*** 0.22** 0.43*** 0.48*** 0.34**
(0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.14)
Life Eligible Crime -0.05 -0.03 -0.10 -0.05 -0.04 -0.11
(0.13) (0.13) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.21)
Age – -0.00 -0.00 – 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Female – 0.16* 0.21** – 0.27* 0.33**
(0.09) (0.08) (0.14) (0.13)
# Prev. Imprisonments – 0.02 0.03 – 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Black – -0.18** -0.16** – – –
(0.08) (0.08)
Hispanic – 0.03 0.02 – – –
(0.11) (0.11)
Constant 0.43*** 0.59*** 0.54*** 0.32*** 0.14 -0.09
(0.07) (0.16) (0.18) (0.10) (0.18) (0.21)
Observations 206 201 201 105 103 103
Adj. R-squared 0.11 0.14 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.25
Other Case Controls NO NO YES NO NO YES
Notes : This table presents OLS regressions of a placebo test of defendant peremptory
strike exhaustion on guilt. The dependent variable in all specifications is a dummy
variable = 1 if a defendant is convicted on at least one charged oﬀense on or after the
date of jury selection, and = 0 otherwise. The primary coeﬃcient of interest is Placebo
Exhausts Strikes, which = 1 if the defendant used one less strike than the limit (n   1
strikes), and = 0 if he used two less strikes than the limit (n   2 strikes). Columns
(1)–(3) measure placebo exhaustion of peremptory strikes for all defendants; columns
(4)–(6) measure placebo exhaustion of strikes by just black defendants. Columns (3) and
(6) include separate case controls for number of for cause strikes issued by the judge,
prosecution, and defense; total number of counts charged; a dummy for whether the
prosecution exhausted its peremptory strikes; and a fixed eﬀect for the year in which jury
selection occurred. Heteroskedastic robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*** = significant at 1% level, ** = significant at 5% level, * = significant at 10% level.
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Appendix
Model
We now formalize the intuition for our identification strategy and propose an extended framework
in which to discuss assumptions. To begin, we parameterize the facts of a case t by a fact index F t
taking values in [0, 1], where 0 represents the weakest case conditions for convicting the defendant,
and 1 represents the strongest.1 We define a juror predisposition function (JPF) as a function
j : [0, 1] ! [0, 1] that takes as input the fact index and gives as output the juror’s predisposition
against a defendant with the corresponding fact index.2 We define a jury pool of size P for trial
t to be a sequence jt1, . . . jtP of JPFs, and a seated jury of size S to be a subsequence {jak}Sk=1 of
length S of the jury pool.
When deciding whether to use a peremptory strike, an attorney must compare the jury can-
didate at hand with the replacement candidate (the juror next in line to be considered if a strike
is used). An important feature of our Florida data is that an attorney has the same level of
information on all potential jurors when he makes his strike decision, including their observable
characteristics and responses to questions they are asked during voir dire.3
After trial, the S jurors render their decision through a unanimous verdict.4 We can thus
aggregate their individual JPFs into a single verdict function:
G (ja1 , . . . , jaS ;F )
G(⇧) inputs the individual JPFs of the seated jury, as well as the facts of the case, and outputs 1
(guilty) or 0 (not guilty).5 For a specific trial t, both parties consider a simpler function Gt : RS !
{0, 1}, defined as:
Gt
 
ja1(F
t), . . . , jaS
 
F t
  
.
1In reality, F t would be multi-dimensional, capturing information such as the evidence against a defendant,
including testimonies, as well as other factors that aﬀect the final verdict, such as the judge. We simplify to a
one-dimensional F t for tractability and because attorneys also likely act on a summary measure when deciding
whether to strike potential jurors.
2Imagine on one extreme the JPF j (F t) = 0, which represents a juror who would support a “not guilty” verdict
no matter the facts; and on the other extreme the JPF j (F t) = 1, which represents a juror who would support a
“guilty” verdict no matter the facts. An impartial juror would have an identity JPF: I (F t) = F t.
3This is not the case in some other jurisdictions. For example, in Middlesex County, New Jersey, attorneys can
observe the pool, but the next juror is revealed and questioned only when it is apparent that a new juror is needed
for the juror box (e.g., a juror in the box has been excused because of a peremptory strike). In this scenario, an
attorney could make his strike decision solely based on the distribution of observable characteristics of the pool.
4For simplification, we ignore the possibility of a hung jury in our model. These comprise a small percentage of
cases in our dataset.
5Sentencing is decided by the judge, not by the jury. The domain of G could be generalized to {0, 1}k, where k
is the number of counts the defendant is charged with. For simplicity, here and in the empirical section, we focus
on 0/1 measures of guilty.
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We assume Gt is strictly increasing in all directions.
We can now model the simplest scenario: whether an attorney should exercise his last peremp-
tory strike after his opponent has already exhausted all of her strikes. Without loss of generality,
suppose ja1(F t)  ja2(F t)  . . .  jaS(F t), and let r be the index number of the replacement juror,
which is non-stochastic because the replacement juror is known. For concreteness, we focus on the
scenario in which the defense attorney has only one strike remaining. She will use this strike if:
Gt
 
ja1(F
t), . . . , jaS
 
F t
  
> G
 
ja1(F
t), . . . , jaS 1
 
F t
 
, jr
 
F t
  
.
Since G is strictly increasing, an equivalent condition is the following:
jaS
 
F t
 
> jr
 
F t
 
We will provide a suﬃcient condition for the strike decision to be independent of the facts of the
case, F t, after the following definition:
Definition 1. We say the jury pool {jk}Pk=1 is F -separated if the ordering of the JPFs {jk}Pk=1 is
constant on the set F : for all F t, F t0 2 F , F t0 > F t, 1  l  P , 1  m  P , if jl (F t) > jm (F t),
then jl
 
F t
0 
> jm (F t) .6
Theorem 1. If a jury pool is F -separated, then the decision to strike does not depend on F t 2 F .
Proof. Suppose that a jury pool, {jk}Pk=1, is F -separated, and has the seated jury {jak}Sk=1 at the
time the defense is deciding whether to use the last strike. Fix F t, F t0 2 F . Without loss of
generality, suppose that F t > F t0 and that ja1(F t)  ja2(F t)  . . .  jaS(F t). Let r be the index
number of the replacement juror. The defense will use the strike if jaS (F t) > jr (F t), which is
equivalent to jaS
 
F t
0 
> jr
 
F t
0  because the jury pool is F -separated. Hence, the strike is used
(or not used) regardless of the value of the fact index.
Assumption 1. The composition of the seated jury at the time of the last strike decision of the
defense does not depend on the fact index.
Assumption (1) allows us to focus on solving the end of the peremptory challenge process.7
It follows from Theorem 1 and Assumption (1) that the composition of the final seated jury is
independent of the fact index. This independence has important implications. First, there should
be no systematic diﬀerences in F t (or anything outside of F t) between n strike cases and n   1
strike cases, since the decision whether to strike does not depend on the facts of the case. Second,
we can allow for asymmetric information or talent: Even if some attorneys are more skilled or have
6If F is an interval, the definition is equivalent to the JPFs not intersecting on F .
7This assumption could be relaxed by modeling the entire sequence of challenges. However, this simple framework
and Theorem 1 capture the main intuition of the setting.
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more information to identify F t than other attorneys, this variation does not lead to a diﬀerence in
the final seated jury. For this result to hold, we must assume one of two things. Either all attorneys
must correctly identify {jk}Pk=1 – that is, during voir dire they identify the JPF for all jurors for
any set of facts, even though they might not know F t. Alternatively, we can assume attorneys
only correctly identify F t and {jk(F t)}Pk=1. That is, instead of assuming correct identification of
all JPFs at all points, it is suﬃcient to assume correct identification of the fact index in that trial
and the JPFs evaluated at that specific fact index.
We can now aggregate the above decision process to show what we identify with the diﬀerence
in averages for the n strike and n   1 strike cases. Suppose there are N cases where all n strikes
were used, and N 1 cases where n  1 strikes were used. When we compare the average conviction
rates for the subset of n cases versus the average for the subset of n  1 cases, we get:
 ˆ =
1
N
NX
i=1
G
⇣
Jbj1 , . . . , Jbjk ;F
⌘
  1
N 1
N 1X
i=1
G
⇣
Jr, . . . , Jbjk ;F
⌘
Viewing these cases as an i.i.d. sample, the Law of Large Numbers implies that:
 ˆ
p! E
n
G
⇣
Jbj1 , . . . , Jbjk ;F
⌘
|Jbj1 > Jr
o
  E
n
G
⇣
Jr, . . . , Jbjk ;F
⌘
|Jbj1  Jr
o
Hence, we would expect  ˆ > 0 and for conviction rates to be higher when the defendant uses all
of his peremptory strikes as compared to instances in which he uses one less strike than the limit.
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Appendix Figures
Figure A.1: For Cause Strikes: Judge Initiated
Notes : This figure shows a histogram for the number of for cause strikes initiated by the judge
in the 604 trials from 2015 through September 2017 in our full dataset (includes cases in which
parties exceeded their peremptory strike limits). Bin size = 2.
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Figure A.2: For Cause Strikes: Defense Initiated
Notes : This figure shows a histogram for the number of for cause strikes successfully requested
by the defense in the 604 trials from 2015 through September 2017 in our full dataset (includes
cases in which parties exceeded their peremptory strike limits).
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Figure A.3: For Cause Strikes: Prosecution Initiated
Notes : This figure shows a histogram for the number of for cause strikes successfully requested
by the prosecution in the 604 trials from 2015 through September 2017 in our full dataset
(includes cases in which parties exceeded their peremptory strike limits).
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Appendix Tables
Table A.1: Jury Pool Characteristics v. Baseline Characteristics
Jury Pool Characteristics
Prop. Black Prop. Female Avg. Age Med. Income
Baseline Characteristics (1) (2) (3) (4)
Defendant characteristics
Age -0.00 0.00 -0.01 6.48
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (13.93)
Black -0.00 0.02 -0.59* -394.22
(0.01) (0.01) (0.34) (370.09)
Hispanic -0.00 0.01 -0.37 -188.82
(0.01) (0.01) (0.44) (467.54)
Female -0.00 0.02 -0.98** -428.69
(0.01) (0.01) (0.43) (472.52)
# Prev. Imprisonments -0.00 -0.01** 0.16 -122.90
(0.00) (0.00) (0.14) (120.23)
Years Prev. Imprison. 0.00 -0.00 -0.07 1.28
(0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (45.81)
Attorney characteristics
Defense Experience 0.00 0.00 0.02 -39.39**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (17.04)
Prosecutor Experience -0.00 0.00** -0.05** -4.45
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (27.34)
Def. Law Sch. Rank -0.00 0.00 -0.01** -0.93
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (2.61)
Pr. Law Sch. Rank -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 3.55
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (2.56)
PD -0.00 -0.00 0.10 -298.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.40) (386.97)
Case characteristics
Homicide -0.01 -0.00 0.07 626.58
(0.01) (0.02) (0.55) (721.39)
Other Violent Oﬀense -0.00 -0.00 -0.36 -146.17
(0.01) (0.01) (0.42) (423.20)
Property Oﬀense -0.01 0.02* -0.19 154.32
(0.01) (0.01) (0.45) (432.31)
Drug Oﬀense 0.00 0.04** -0.67 504.28
(0.01) (0.02) (0.60) (673.07)
Sex Oﬀense 0.01 0.02 -0.77 -619.37
(0.01) (0.02) (0.52) (626.15)
Weapons Oﬀense -0.01 0.02 -0.17 -47.47
(0.01) (0.02) (0.74) (902.06)
Counts Charged -0.00 -0.00 0.01 67.49
(0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (59.28)
Observations 527 527 527 527
Adj. R-squared -0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.01
F-Statistic 0.49 2.15 1.39 0.89
Notes : This table shows OLS regression estimates (with heteroskedastic robust
standard errors) of various baseline defendant, attorney, and case characteristics
on jury pool characteristics as listed at the top of each column. Pool income is
the median across jurors within a pool, with each juror’s income estimated by the
median income in the zip code in which she resides (using U.S. Census data and
2017 inflation-adjusted dollars). "Other Oﬀense" is an omitted category for case
characteristics. All variables are as described in previous tables and the text. The
F-statistic jointly tests whether all coeﬃcients are = 0 in a given regression. ***
= significant at 1% level, ** = significant at 5% level, * = significant at 10% level.
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